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The Election of 30N by Carmelo Urza In late summer 1986, an internal crisis rocked the ruling Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and brought down the government of the Autonomous Basque Community. Six years after assuming absolute control of the Basque government, the PNV was forced to dissolve the central Basque parliament and call for new elections on November 30, 1986. The election of 30N, as it became known, was quickly recognized as the most unpredictable since those of 1977 and it was widely believed that the results would change the face of politics in the Basque Country. Events leading to this crisis began years earlier. Administratively, there are four representational assemblies to which a politician from the Basque Country can aspire. In ever widening concentric circles, they are: 1) the assembly of each individual province: Gipuzkoa, Araba and Bizkaia; 2) the parliament of the Autonomous Basque Community, located in Vitoria-Gasteiz, which establishes legislation for all three provinces; 3) the parliament in Madrid which legislates for the entire Spanish state; and 4) the European parliament in Strasbourg. The election of 30N would determine the makeup of the parliament in Vitoria-Gasteiz, but would impact others as well. Oversimplified, political parties in Euskadi, the Basque Country, may be categorized according to two factors. First, they are differentiated by traditional left-right or liberal-conservative tendencies. In a second fashion, parties are characterized by their adherence to Basque nationalism or broader Spanish nationalism. The former are regarded as nationalist parties and include HB (Herri Batasuna – Unity of the People), EE (Euskadiko Ezkerra – The Basque Left), EA (Eusko Alkartasuna – Basque Solidarity), and PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco – Basque Nationalist Party). The Spanish parties are represented by the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español – Spanish Worker’s Socialist Party), CDS (Centro Democrático y Social – Democratic and Social Center) and the right wing CP (Coalición Popular – Popular Coalition). Thus, on a nationalist tangent, EE has more in common with the PNV than with PSOE. On the left-right continuum, it shares greater affinity with the latter than the former. A voter is able to vote his ideology: Basque and left or right or Spanish and left or right. In 1980, the first parliamentary elections in Euskadi since 1936, the PNV won sufficient seats to enable governance without the consent of other parties. Since all parliamentarians vote according to the dictates of the party, real authority was vested in the PNV and its head, Xavier Arzalluz. According to party rules, even the PNV lehendakari (Prime Minister), Carlos Garaikoetxea, should technically have taken the oath of obedience to the party. Garaikoetxea, however, manifested an independent spirit from the outset, and was frequently at odds with his own party as well as with the central Spanish government in Madrid. Believing himself to be the Lehendakari of all his constituents, he demanded and received exemption from strict party obedience. Furthermore, Garaikoetxea’s vision of the political organization of the Basque Country provided for a strong Basque government in Vitoria-Gasteiz. This was counter to the philosophy of Arzalluz, who wished to retain the political and financial authority of the Basque Country at the level of the individual Diputaciones or provincial governments. Unable to win the internal struggle, Garaikoetxea and other dissenters, later called “critics,” decried what they perceived as a lack of democracy within the party. In January of 1985, Garaikoetxea was replaced as Lehendakari by José Antonio Ardanza. Soon after, the PNV began purging itself of the critics and initiating disciplinary action against others, including the former Lehendakari. After a long and bitter feud, Garaikoetxea and other prominent critics left the PNV (each side views itself as the victim in this issue). Taking their parliamentary seats into the opposition, they formed a new party, to be called Eusko Alkartasuna (EA). The PNV thereby lost its majority in Parliament. It moved to shore up its position by forming a pact with the PSOE, but by October of 1986 it was clear that the party could no longer govern in “dignified” fashion, and it called for new elections. The precipitous recourse to the ballot box may also have been a PNV strategy to harass the newly established EA party, which had to organize itself in only a few weeks in order to run an effective campaign. EAs campaign was not handicapped by any lack of funds. Rather, it is the government which principally finances any party’s campaign. The disbursements take place after the election, with the amount determined by the number of votes and seats achieved. Parties borrow campaign funds prior to the elections, hoping for sufficient votes to recoup from the government a large portion of their expenditure. While it could be argued that this system supports established parties, it also favors a splinter group with a strong initial constituency. The schism and subsequent formation of the new EA party created numerous conflicts which could only be resolved by the courts. In Basque elections each party selects a list of candidates for the 25 parliamentary seats corresponding to each province. The electorate votes a straight party ticket and the party’s share of the popular vote translates into its number of seats in Parliament. If, for example, the PNV gains 40 percent of the votes cast in Bizkaia, it is entitled to ten of the province’s 25 seats – and the ten top individuals presented on the Bizkaia PNV party list are elected to office. Consequently, since voters must cast a straight party vote, the PNV argued that party dissidents had been elected to office only through their party affiliation and should not be allowed to keep their seats once they left it. Furthermore, some batzokiak or PNV social meeting halls, were claimed by both the PNV and the EA dissidents. This provided additional litigation to the courts, and engendered considerable bitterness between the two parties. The elections of 30N were fraught with uncertainty. Would the newly formed EA party have time to organize a viable campaign in only a few weeks? To what extent would the party schism affect the issue of Basque nationalism? The Socialists claimed that the crisis represented the failure of Basque nationalism and, indeed, there was considerable disillusionment among moderate Basque nationalists who had deplored the infighting within their ranks. No one doubted that the political picture in the Basque Country would be drastically different after the 30th of November. With the dilution of moderate nationalist votes, it was virtually certain that no party would gain an absolute majority in parliament. Consequently, a coalition government composed of two or more parties, would be required to govern. In other words, of one pundit, the Basque political situation had evolved from that of Mexico (with its institutionalized PRI party rule) to that of Italy (with its unstable coalition governments). Some argued that the coalition format would weaken the Basque government, others that it would incorporate participants of a wider philosophical spectrum and thus be more representative. Nationalism One litmus test of Basque nationalism is the extent to which a party is willing to accept the institutions of the Spanish State and to collaborate with it on the practical matters of government. Those who advocate compromise run the risk of being regarded as pro-Spanish puppets and traitors to the Basque cause. Nonetheless, most Basque nationalist parties believe it necessary to work with the Spanish State in order to receive favorable economic and social assistance and to negotiate further transfers of governmental functions to an autonomous Basque Country. Reconciliation of governance, politics and political ideology oftentimes requires a delicate balancing act. During the elections of 30N, each Basque nationalist party portrayed Madrid as the common enemy while attempting to arrogate to itself the mantel of leadership of the Basque cause. The PNV, for example, accused EA and EE of already having reached a coalition agreement with the dreaded PSOE socialists. They responded by noting that the PNV had already formed a pact with the PSOE prior to the dissolution of parliament. HB attacked the other nationalist parties equally on this point. As the most radical of the Basque nationalist parties, HB has refused to send its elected representatives to the parliaments of either Madrid or Vitoria-Gasteiz, arguing that neither is a legitimate forum when the ultimate goal is Basque independence. HB sent a representative (Juan Carlos Yoldi) to the February 1987 parliamentary session for the first time. It remains to be seen if their attendance marks a historic aperture or a single occurrence. Perhaps the most besieged of the Basque nationalist parties was the PNV, which attempted to portray the PSOE as the bogeyman of the Basques. PNV candidates stated that “The socialists want to see Euskadi muzzled and on its knees.” According to the PNV, the PSOE wanted the Basque Country to renounce “its culture, its language, and its economy.” Consequently, they attempted to portray the elections as a choice between the PNV and the PSOE. “Each vote cast for another Basque nationalist option is a lost vote,” stated Lehendakari Ardanza. The PNV exhorted the electorate to vote for it with the slogan of “Just in case.” As Lehendakari during the first part of the decade, EAs Garaikoetxea frequently confronted the Spanish socialists, oftentimes making symbolic gestures such as refusing to fly the Spanish flag in front of the Ajuria Enea, the Basque White House. As a result, it was generally accepted that the socialists preferred to deal with the Ardanza government, giving EA greater credibility among some nationalists. Furthermore, Garaikoetxea ran a symbolic campaign which tapped the Basque aspirations. He included French Basques in his party in order to underscore his desire for Basque unification within a European federal structure. He also argued for the legitimacy of Basque independence. Garaikoetxea accused the PNV of hypocrisy by “putting on the lamb’s coat in Madrid while becoming the seven machos in Euskadi” As a result, the PNV was sometimes put in the uncomfortable position of defending its patriotism. EAs slogan was “Recover the illusion.” While the PNV and HB assailed and were assailed equally by Spanish and Basque parties alike, the PSOE had a much clearer strategy. Txiki Benegas, the leading socialist candidate, was clearly “Madrid’s man” and he turned this to his advantage. The PSOE campaign was based on a perception that Basque nationalism had failed and that the Basque Country was in serious economic and political trouble. It argued for cooperation with the central government and employed the slogan: “In agreement [with Madrid] for Euskadi.” Election Issues Some issues won unanimous support from all the principal parties: the fight against drugs and petty crime, the fight for consumer protection, programs for the youth, protection of the environment and programs for senior citizens. The campaign literature of all the parties was also saturated with language calling for a more just society, defense of human rights, tolerance, the end of social discrimination, better education, and stability. There were, however, areas of major disagreement. (1) Perhaps the most emotional issue had to do with the armed organization ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna – Basque land and freedom) founded in 1959, which now favors an armed struggle to create an independent and Marxist Basque Country. The advent of democracy in Spain and the creation of an Autonomous Basque Community have brought ETA tactics under increasing condemnation from most political parties (excepting HB), as well as by the states of Spain and France. It has periodically been suggested that a solution to the Basque question requires direct and substantive negotiations between ETA and the Spanish government. Most political parties favor some form of discussion among all the players, although only HB favors actual negotiation of substantive political issues. The others argue that negotiation with an armed group rewards violence and circumvents the democratic process. ETA, they claim, was not elected by the people and thus has no right to negotiate political issues which affect the Basque Country. The often repeated phrase by the anti-negotiation parties is that “In a democracy, you can’t impose the will of 15% of the population upon the other 85%.” The 15% quoted as supporting negotiations roughly represent the percentage of votes held by HB, the only party which unequivocally favors meaningful negotiations between ETA and the Spanish government. Indeed, negotiation was HBs primary campaign issue during 30N. In the words of party leader Iñaki Esnaola, “ETA and the Spanish State should someday negotiate the true stability of Euskadi and if we accomplish that we will have won…” Despite intermittent press reports of meetings between Spanish government representatives and ETA, the Spanish government, dominated by the PSOE, excludes the possibility of negotiating anything but the terms of surrender. “If ETA wants peace,” stated Txiki Benegas, “let them abandon the machine guns.” HB contends that the true violence is initiated in Madrid with restrictive legislation, police occupation and GAL (an organization suspected of receiving support from the central government and which killed suspected ETA sympathizers in the French Basque Country until France agreed to extradite suspected ETA members). Thus, while the socialists base their campaign on the “democratic values of tolerance and peace,” and HB on “the peace of democracy and liberty,” each side understands these principles in mutually exclusive terms. (2) Independence of the Autonomous Basque Community from the Spanish State is not possible under the present Spanish constitution. As an independentist party, HB chooses, therefore, not to accept the constitution or the institutions (parliaments, etc.) derived from it. Their argument is bolstered by the fact that less than a third of the Basque Country voted in favor of the constitution in the 1978 referendum. HB also wants Navarra incorporated into the Basque Community immediately. A key and revealing issue subordinate to that of outright independence is that of self-determination. The PNV, EA, HB, and EE, that is, all of the nationalist parties favor the Basque Country’s right to determine its own political destiny. The PNV militants have mixed emotions concerning independence, but the party officially rejects it as a realistic goal. EA aspires to independence made possible through a constitutional amendment but is very pragmatic and is willing to work with the Spanish State in order to gain greater autonomy. The PSOE, AP and CDS firmly embrace the Spanish constitution and oppose Basque independence. (3) A further bone of contention among the parties is the nature of the present relationship between Madrid and Vitoria-Gasteiz. The Statute of Guernica, adopted by the Basque Country pursuant to Spanish constitutional authority, articulates the distribution of governmental functions between the central Spanish and the Autonomous Basque governments. This mandate is, however, subject to interpretation: the Spanish government has taken a narrow view while the Basque parties espouse a more liberal approach. While there have been halting transfers of functions from Madrid to Vitoria, the process is still incomplete, and further transfers are constantly being negotiated. Because it forecloses independence of the Basque Country, HB does not accept the Statute. Emphasizing that it was approved by a majority vote of 60%, EA and the PNV endorse it, but argue that the Statute specifies only the “minimum” autonomy guaranteed by the constitution. In other words, they maintain that it sets the initial conditions but not the ultimate limits of the autonomous process. All of the Basque nationalist parties wish to see the Statute’s provisions met as quickly as possible. All argue that the constitutional and statutory provisions concede to the Basques the responsibility of policing Euskadi. The Spanish parties do not believe that the document compels the Spanish government to remove the Spanish Guardia Civil and the National Police from the area, but rather requires them to coordinate their efforts with the Basque Police. The continued presence of the disliked Spanish forces is a source of much aggravation to the Basques. (4) Cultural issues also permeated campaign rhetoric. Most Basques believe Euskera, the Basque language, is the nucleus of their identity and should constitute an essential ingredient of education in Euskadi. While less than a third of the people speak Basque today, there has been a virtual renaissance of the language in the last ten years. All of the political parties claim to respect and support the use of Euskera and, indeed, official party platforms do not reveal great differences in this regard. In fact, the language issue is highly divisive, and the elections of 30N clearly portrayed the nationalist parties as the defenders of Euskera. Particularly controversial was the issue of ikastolak, the once clandestine, privately-supported schools which taught their students exclusively in Basque. Now legal, the ikastolak wish to move into the public sector, competing with existing public schools for scarce resources. Non-Basque speakers, largely represented by the Spanish parties, have leveled charges of discrimination by the Basque government for its favoring of Euskera. Some of these accusations surfaced during the campaign of 30N when an ikastola was given permission by the city hall of Bilbao to use four classes of a public school. Some of the parents of the public school students occupied the building, and all classes were suspended until the Basque police forcefully removed them. The socialists accused the authorities of using violence and brutality and of an inexcusable action. The PSOE has also accused the Basque government of wanting to impose Euskera while converting it into an “element of social discrimination and of political indoctrination.” CP also attacked the PNV government for working “solely and exclusively to favor the ikastolak.” Furthermore, the PNV was blamed for perceived arbitrary policies which ignored dialogue and lacked consensus. In Txiki Benegas’ words: “ A model is being imposed which attempts to develop or install ikastolak at the expense of closing or transforming public schools into them.” The PSOE also bristled at the suggestion that Euskera is the exclusive patrimony of the Basque nationalists: “As the autochthonous language that it is, it is a cultural possession of all the Basque citizens and we are not disposed to having it manipulated in an exclusivist manner.” Basque nationalists on the other hand, believe that since the language has been discriminated against (indeed it was outlawed under the Franco regime) and since its use is now unequal to Spanish, it should receive special consideration and support. The Spanish parties disagree with this affirmation action approach to Euskera. Euskera also became a factor in determining a proper Lehendakari. Many nationalists felt that the PSOEs Txiki Benegas and EEs Bandres did not qualify as candidates because they did not speak Basque. The socialists responded that if the Basque language is a requirement for Lehendakari, it would exclude 80% (their figure) of the Basques, relegating them to the status of second class citizens. (5) With unemployment hovering close to 25%, the economy was one area all parties wanted improved. As the ruling party largely responsible for economic policy in Euskadi, the PNV tried to put the best face possible on the economic situation. It contended that the economy had bottomed out and had begun to rebound. On this issue, however, the PNV was caught in a crossfire from Spanish and Basque nationalist parties alike. The PSOE revealed economical statistics which, they claim, proved the Basque economy was still backsliding while the overall Spanish economy was improving. The socialists contended that Basque government policy and terrorism were the culprits. Spanish Vice President Alfonso Guerra promised more economic assistance for Euskadi if the socialists won the election. Meanwhile, EE revealed documents presented by the Basque government at the European Parliament in Strasbourg which, it claimed, showed that the “economic and industrial activity in the Basque Country is decreasing.” EE accused the Basque government and the PNV of “deceiving the people in an intolerable fashion,” and of “helping friends with public funds.” HB, taking a leftist approach, accused both the Basque and Spanish governments of not serving the interests of the workers, as well as of incompetence. The PNVs credibility was damaged when it admitted that “exaggerated statistics are sent” to Brussels in order to receive economic assistance, but counterattacked with numbers which showed an improvement in the economy. Xavier Arzalluz himself also blamed the Spanish government for economically marginating the Basque Country by diverting foreign investments and government assistance to other regions of the Spanish state. Finally the PNVs Iñigo Aguirre raised the spectre of the socialist bogeyman by announcing that “if the PSOE governs, hunger will arrive” in Euskadi. (6) The final electoral issue regards the Law of Historical Territories. Approved by the Basque Parliament in Vitoria, the law distributes governmental functions among the central Basque government in Vitoria, the three provincial governments and the municipalities. The present law, favored by the PNV, entrusts a great deal of authority to the provincial and municipal governments. A second law, The Law of General Assemblies, provides greater proportional representation to the rural areas than to the urban ones. Since the PNV stronghold lies in the rural areas, many consider this law a political ploy of the PNV. The PNV strongly favors maintaining these two laws while the other parties want them revised. Election Results The results of the 30N parliamentary elections, contrasted with the first post-Franco parliamentary elections in the Basque Country in 1980, are as follows: (see table)
*Only 60 seats were selected in the 1980 election. The Communist Party (PCE) held one seat and the Christian Democratic Party (UCD) held 6 seats. The Communist Party is no longer a factor and remnants of the UCD now constitute the CDS. Except for CP, the clear loser (in 1984 this party had 6 seats), each party had something to crow about. The socialists had won the greatest number of seats. The PNV received the greatest number of popular votes, although many came from Bizkaia where a larger electorate produces only 25 seats, the same as in the other two provinces. (Each of the provinces was won by a different party: EA, Gipuzkoa; PNV, Bizkaia; PSOE, Araba). EE increased its seats by 50% and HB also had a significant increase. EA won Gipuzkoa and a third place finish only weeks after its formation as a party. It was therefore an immediate force in Basque affairs. CDS, a newly-formed Spanish party, became a force in the Basque Country and strengthened its hand in Spanish politics. Each victory was, however, tempered by a sense of loss. The Spanish-oriented socialists would have to form a government in a community whose nationalist sentiments were manifestly stronger than ever, having garnered 53 of the 75 seats. As the French newspaper Le Quotidien put it: “It is certain that Basque nationalism is divided into four great families, but never has it been so strong.” The socialist triumph was even more precarious considering that the PSOE received 20,000 fewer votes than did the divided PNV. Through internal dissent, the PNV suffered the loss of a controlling number of seats. Consequently, for the first time in six years the PNV lost the leadership of government and Basque nationalists and no longer held the reins of authority in Vitoria-Gasteiz. The election of 30N answered many questions, but it did little to determine the governance of the Basque Country. Clearly an agreement between two or more parties would be required to form a government. Coalition The parties had two months from the time of the balloting to form a new government or face new elections. What ensued was an enormously complex period of negotiations (with much posturing, bluffing and feigning) not unlike a championship mus card game with several hordagos (an all-or-nothing challenge). In light of the preponderant nationalist vote, there was a sense that much of the electorate desired a government formed by Basque nationalist parties only. However, none of the parties seriously entertained the partnership with HB, leaving the field to the PNV, EE and EA. Ideological differences seemed to preclude a PNV-EE partnership. Despite their common roots, the schism between EA and the PNV was too bitter and too recent. In addition, such a coalition would minimize the philosophical differences which led to the rupture. “Why,” many asked, “divide the country only to form the same government?” The real chess match took place between the PNV and the EA. Each had sufficient experience and support to legitimately aspire to government, however, each would have to do so by joining forces with the distrusted socialists. It was initially expected that the EA, EE and PSOE would announce a coalition momentarily, and that the venerable PNV might cross over to join the opposition. In view of the problematic relationship among nationalist parties, the PSOE necessarily had to become one of the partners of a coalition, pacting with a nationalist party. Within the framework of Basque nationalist politics, there was considerable risk in joining with the socialists, and it was evident that the PSOE would have to make major concessions to its coalition partner to enable Basque nationalists to accept and defend the pact. While none of the players were dealt overpowering cards, none desired a new election. Furthermore, the forthcoming municipal elections scheduled for June 1987 loomed large in their calculations. Any Euskadi-wide coalition might carry over into the municipal elections, marginating the non-pact parties. Any nationalist party pacting wit the socialists would, however, be at a decided disadvantage if, in the interim, the coalition collapsed resulting in new elections. To further complicate the question of governability, the PNV had ruled since 1977 and during that time a preponderance of permanent civil service positions had been filled by party loyalists. Could any coalition, not including the PNV, govern in such a bureaucratic environment? At the eleventh hour it was announced that EA and EE would form a minority government. Soon after the PNV and the PSOE stepped forward with a majority coalition. The CDS party was included as well, adding the vital two seats necessary to achieve an absolute majority in the Basque parliament. It remains to be seen whether the PNV-PSOE-CDS coalition will last. The election of 30N is rich in irony. Basque nationalism has never been stronger, nor has its divisiveness been more evident. The overall result may alternatively be viewed as evidence of political vitality or as weakness and hence reason for solace to the enemies of Basque autonomy. Only future events will decide this ultimate question. |
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